Sep 8

Bob Woodward’s new book, A War Within, is out, and is generating headlines with the report that the Bush administration spied on many in the Iraqi government, including Prime Minister Maliki.  (With Maliki, it was apparently successful enough to “know everything he says.”)  I really think the inclusion of this piece of information was a substantial failure of discretion on Woodward’s part.  Of course we were spying on the Iraqi government.  It would have been negligent not to spy on them.  There were death squads working for the Interior Ministry, and some people seem offended that we didn’t just trust them on principle.  It’s offensive, they say, that we were spying on an ally.

This reaction is incredibly naive.  Almost every country on earth has an intelligence program, and they all spy on each other, including their allies.  The US, for example, gets spied on by Israel and spies on France.  It’s not all bad — if your ally has a spy in your government, they know your promises to them aren’t lies, and there’s a lot more trust all around.  Good or bad, though, it’s business as usual.  No government is really particularly surprised or offended by it.  Their populations are, though, so the government has to act as if it’s a horrible surprise.

And this is exactly why I don’t think Woodward should have published what he did.  It angers Iraqis and damages the chance of success there.  (It should be noted that “success” in this case isn’t just something that’s good for the US, but pretty uncontroversially good for everyone.)  It’s harmful, but has no particular value to public discourse.  The spying isn’t controversial amongst anyone with the power to do anything about it.

There is, of course, a more complicated issue here.  The information in question was probably classified.  Clearly Woodward has a legal right to print it, but the person who told him the info was probably breaking the law.  In an investigation, Woodward could be called to testify and imprisoned if he didn’t reveal his sources.  Would it be proper to undertake these investigations and punishments?  Would it be better if they weren’t legally available?

The real problem with the shield law debate is that intuitions vary so much based on the information in question.  If the government has a secret program to burn down the houses of everyone who voted against the incumbent party, and you know it, you should leak it.  No one will disagree with this, and you’d probably have a parade thrown in your honor.  If instead you leak technical diagrams of US military weaponry, and the Washington Post publishes them on the front page, no one would support the Post, and everyone would support an investigation to find the leak.  The dilemma, of course, is that any law punishes someone for leaking (or printing) classified information applies equally well in both cases.  You can’t write an “unless it was good” exception.

In the end, I’m inclined to accept the status quo here.  It’s very unusual for reporters to be supboenaed and their ability to report stays intact.  (I disagree with those who want Woodward fired/subpoenaed/whatever.  I don’t think he should have printed this, but he has some very good stuff about why violence is decreasing in Iraq, and to have some subjective, unpredictable standard is going to silence a lot of good reporting.)  There is, though, some risk.  When you leak something idiotic, like the identity of a CIA agent, there is definitely some danger of jail time.  I feel uncomfortable depending so heavily on prosecutorial discretion, which can easily be political, but I don’t see any better alternative here.

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Jul 19

Until recently I have been torn about what to do in Iraq.  That makes me a bit of an exception, since most people who are well-informed and care about the issue have very strong opinions.  Still, while I have leaned towards the anti-war view, I’ve always been very conflicted about it.

I believe that, in retrospect, the war was clearly a mistake, but I don’t blame most of the people who supported it at the time.  At that time, the argument hinged largely on the existence of WMDs, or at least substantial WMD programs, and that existence was vouched for in very strong terms by the nation’s intelligence agencies.  Given a belief in the WMD accusations, the decision to go to war, while still somewhat dubious, was at least understandable.  I don’t think there was any real reason to doubt the WMD accusations at the time, either.  Even most people who opposed the war believed there was some truth to those accusations.  Saddam was definitely acting as though he had something to hide.  The real blame for the error in going to war lies in my mind with the intelligence agencies who got the facts wrong, and (most importantly) with the Bush administration, which from all accounts created an atmosphere where dissenting opinions were ignored, and delivering evidence and/or analysis to support preconceived goals was rewarded.

Once in, of course, there are lots of reasons to try to succeed in Iraq despite the fact that we shouldn’t have been there in the first place.  A stable, friendly democracy in the Middle East would be a huge improvement, and an unstable, fractured, and dysfunctional Iraq would be a huge disaster.  The real problem for me in determining the right course of action was the great degree of uncertainty connected to either course of action.  Withdrawal could put pressure on the Iraqi government to step up, make some tough decisions, make the political compromises it needed to, and really take control.  However, it could also lead to total failure.  Similarly, staying in could eventually produce an acceptable outcome, but could also be hopeless, leading to the same disaster but with more lives and money wasted in the meantime.  Given that all four of these outcomes seemed possible to me, there was not much of a way to decide on a clearly correct course of action.

One thing that was clear to me was that if we were going to stay in, the surge was the right way to do it.  It was at least a clear improvement over what had been the status quo up to that point.  (On a related point, another reason I don’t blame those who supported the choice to go to war is that much of the cost of the war has been more the result of mismanagement than a necessary cost of such an endeavor.  Yes, the danger of mismanagement is always something you should take into account when making a decision like that, but the level of idiocy in the conduct of the war seems like something that someone should be forgiven for not foreseeing.)

All of my indecision has gone away recently, though, as the Iraqi government has begun to push for the kind of timeline that Democrats have been asking for all along.  The most extreme example came today when al-Maliki said that Obama’s 16-month time frame was correct.  As far as I’m concerned, whether a timeline was a good idea before or not, this request from Iraq makes it the obviously correct course of action now.  Iraq is a sovereign nation with its own democratically elected government.  Because Iraq depends on the US for its security, the US has incredible leverage over the Iraqi government, but that should not be mistaken for a lack of Iraqi sovereignty.  In the end, if Iraq asks the US troops to leave, they have to go.

McCain has said this himself in the past, but now seems to refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the request.  The reason he gives, that al-Maliki is just doing this for domestic political reasons, is idiotic.  That’s what’s supposed to happen in a democracy.  If the vast majority of voters within a country believe something to be good policy, their leaders should be forced to fall in line with that belief.  If anything, the fact that this is the will of the Iraqi populace rather than of al-Maliki personally should make it a more important request.  Is it best for Iraq if the US leaves?  Probably.  It’s definitely not certain, but it’s the future of Iraq that is at stake, and when there’s a tough call to make, it’s the Iraqi people who should get to make it.

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